For the first time since 1998, the United States joined Japan in buying yen to support the Japanese currency.
The move was extraordinary. Its limited staying power was more revealing.
Two of the world’s largest governments could interrupt the yen’s decline. They couldn’t remove the forces behind it.
And that’s why this story matters well beyond Japan.
This isn’t principally a currency story. It’s a story about what happens when the country that supplied the world with cheap capital for decades begins demanding a return again.
The world’s great supplier of cheap capital
For nearly three decades, Japanese interest rates sat close to zero — and, at times, below it.
That created an unusual problem for a nation with enormous pools of savings: there wasn’t much money to be made from money at home.
So Japanese banks, insurers, pension funds and households looked elsewhere.
Japan became one of the world’s great exporters of capital, helping finance governments, businesses and markets well beyond its borders.
Cheap Japanese money also fuelled the famous yen carry trade. Investors could borrow cheaply in yen and put the proceeds to work in higher-returning assets elsewhere.
For years, the maths was compelling. With US interest rates well above those in Japan, American assets were an obvious destination.
But there was a consequence. Money flowing out of Japan also put downward pressure on the yen.
Eventually, what was a cheap currency becomes expensive. Japan imports much of what it consumes, particularly energy, and a weaker yen raises those costs at home.
That gives Japan a clear reason to defend its currency.
The more interesting question is why America helped.
When Japan’s problem becomes America’s
Japan is the largest foreign holder of US Treasury securities.
That’s an important detail.
One way Japan can raise the dollars required to support the yen is by drawing on its enormous portfolio of foreign assets. If that involves selling significant quantities of US Treasuries, it creates another problem entirely.
America needs buyers for its debt.
But, what happens when their major buyer becomes the seller? Treasury prices fall and yields rise. And, because higher Treasury yields don’t remain conveniently contained in the bond market: they influence borrowing costs across mortgages, businesses, governments and asset valuations.
Suddenly, a Japanese currency problem has the potential to become an American funding problem.
US support for Japan can therefore be viewed in two ways.
It helped an important ally defend its currency.
It may also have helped reduce the risk that Japan would defend the yen by selling the very American debt Washington needs global investors to keep buying.
And that brings us to the bigger story.
Japan has somewhere else to put its money
For decades, Japanese investors looked offshore partly because the alternative at home wasn’t particularly appealing.
That is changing.
Japanese interest rates are rising. Government bond yields have climbed to levels that would have seemed extraordinary only a few years ago. For the first time in a generation, Japanese savers can earn a meaningful return without necessarily sending their capital overseas.
That doesn’t mean Japanese investors suddenly sell everything they own in New York, London or Sydney and bring the money home.
They don’t need to.
Capital rarely needs to stampede to change prices. The marginal buyer simply needs a better alternative.
Imagine a Japanese institution deciding where to allocate its next billion dollars.
For years, earning almost nothing at home made the decision to invest offshore relatively easy.
If Japanese government bonds now offer a credible return, the calculation changes. An overseas borrower may simply have to offer more to remain attractive.
Multiply that decision across banks, insurers, pension funds and investors and something important starts to happen: the world’s capital becomes more expensive.
The return of the cost of capital
Japan is the most fascinating example, but it isn’t alone.
Global government bond yields have climbed back to levels not seen since before the ultra-low-rate era. Governments are carrying enormous debts. Businesses need capital. Infrastructure and defence spending require funding. The energy transition requires it too.
There are plenty of people asking for money.
The people supplying it are rediscovering that they can demand something in return.
That matters because the post-GFC investment world conditioned us to think about the cost of money principally through central banks.
Will the RBA cut?
Will the Federal Reserve raise?
What will the Bank of Japan do next?
Those questions are still relevant. But increasingly, central banks aren’t the only ones setting the price.
The world’s savers get a vote too.
Why this matters here
Australia can feel a long way from a battle over the yen and US Treasuries.
Our capital markets don’t agree.
Australian banks borrow in global markets. So do businesses. Governments issue debt into markets where they compete with borrowers around the world. Investment portfolios price assets relative to the returns available elsewhere.
That means the global cost of money can move even when the RBA does nothing.
For a household, it can eventually appear in borrowing rates. For a business owner, it can change the cost of financing expansion or the valuation a buyer is willing to pay. For an investor, higher bond yields change the relative attractiveness of shares, property and other assets.
And for retirees, there is another side to the equation: after years in which defensive assets offered very little income, being paid properly to lend money again isn’t necessarily bad news.
The cost of capital is somebody’s cost.
It is also somebody else’s return.
Our view
This isn’t a forecast of a Japanese currency crisis, nor are we predicting a sudden withdrawal of Japanese money from global markets.
The structural shift is more subtle — and potentially more important.
Capital is becoming more contested.
Governments want affordable finance. Businesses want capital to grow. Savers want to be properly compensated for providing it. And asset markets spent much of the past decade becoming accustomed to money being plentiful and cheap.
Those interests no longer align as comfortably as they once did.
For investors, that argues for something rather less dramatic than trying to predict the next move in the yen. It means paying attention to what you own, what you paid for it, how much debt sits underneath it and whether your portfolio genuinely has more than one way to produce a return.
Because the defining question of the last decade was often: What will central banks do next?
The question for the decade ahead may increasingly be: What return will the world’s savers demand.
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